We devise cost sharing methods for connected facility location games that are cross-monotonic, competitive and recover a constant fraction of the optimal cost. The novelty of this work is that we use randomized algorithms and that we share the expected cost among the participating users. We also provide a primal-dual cost sharing method for the connected facility location game with opening costs.
INTRODUCTION
The problem of achieving truth-revealing or strategyproof mechanisms for sharing the cost of deploying a network infrastructure has recently received a growing attention. In this work, we are interested in designing cost sharing mechanisms that would encourage agents to cooperate to share the cost of the network facility and to reveal their true values for receiving the service, i.e., group-strategyproof mechanisms for which truthfulness is a dominant strategy for every user or coalition of users.
We are given a set U of (potential) users. Each user j ∈ U has a utility uj for receiving the service; if j is asked to pay more than uj, he prefers to drop the offer. For a subset Q ⊆ U , let C(Q) denote the cost of servicing all users in Q. A cost sharing mechanism determines (i) a set Q ⊆ U of participating users that receive the service, and (ii) how to distribute the servicing cost C(Q) among the users in Q such that each user j ∈ Q is willing to pay his cost share, pj . The benefit of a user j is uj −pj if j ∈ Q, and zero otherwise. We assume that each user is selfish and hence may misreport his utility so as to maximize his benefit. A cost sharing mechanism is strategyproof if each user has no incentive to misreport his utility; it is said to be group-strategyproof if the same holds even if users collude.
Given a set Q of participating users, a cost sharing method ξ computes a cost share ξj(Q) for each user j ∈ Q. A cost sharing method is cross-monotonic if it satisfies
Moulin and Shenker [5] proved that, given a cross-monotonic cost sharing method ξ, one can devise a cost sharing mechanism that is group-strategyproof.
We are interested in cost sharing methods that satisfy competitiveness and approximate cost recovery. That is, (i) the participating users in Q are charged at most the optimal cost, C * (Q), i.e., j∈Q ξj (Q) ≤ C * (Q), and (ii) at least a constant fraction 1/λ of the cost C(Q) of the constructed solution is recovered, i.e., j∈Q ξj(Q) ≥ C(Q)/λ. We call such a method a λ-approximate cost sharing method.
We devise approximate cross-monotonic cost sharing methods for connected facility location games (CFL). We are given an undirected graph G = (V, E) with non-negative edge costs ce, a set F ⊆ V of facilities with opening cost fi for each facility i ∈ F, a set U ⊆ V of users and a parameter M > 1. The goal is to open a subset F ⊆ F of facilities, to connect each user j ∈ U to the closest open facility i(j) ∈ F and to build a Steiner tree T connecting all open facilities in F . The objective is to minimize
where c(·, ·) is the shortest path distance with respect to c, and c(T ) is the cost of the edges in the Steiner tree T . We assume without loss of generality that a root node r ∈ F, which is open in some optimal solution, is known in advance.
In rent-or-buy network design problems an edge e can either be bought at cost M · ce, or rented at cost ce; a bought edge can be used by an arbitrary number of paths, while a rented edge e costs ce for each path that uses it. The singlesource rent-or-buy problem (SSRB) is a special case of CFL, where a facility can be opened at any node and all opening costs are zero, i.e., F = V and fi = 0 for each i ∈ F.
RELATED WORK
Moulin and Shenker [5] developed cross-monotonic cost sharing methods if the optimal cost function is a submodular function of the set U . However, this is not the case for several network design problems such as Steiner tree, facility location or rent-or-buy network design. Jain and Vazirani [4] presented a cross-monotonic cost sharing method for the minimum spanning tree game and therefore a 2-approximate cost sharing method for the Steiner tree game. Devanur, Mihail and Vazirani [1] proposed strategyproof mechanisms for vertex cover and facility location games based on primaldual algorithms. However, their algorithms are not groupstrategyproof. Very recently, Pál and Tardos [6] proposed cross-monotonic cost sharing methods for facility location and SSRB. They present a 3-approximate cost sharing method for facility location and a 15-approximate cost sharing method for SSRB.
SINGLE-SOURCE RENT-OR-BUY
Our method is based on the randomized algorithm proposed by Gupta, Kumar and Roughgarden [2] , leading to a randomized (2 + ρST)-approximation algorithm for SSRB, where ρST denotes the approximation ratio of the Steiner tree algorithm used in Step 2 below. For a given set Q ⊆ U of users, the algorithm works as follows:
1. Mark each user j ∈ Q with probability 1/M . Let Q ⊆ Q denote the set of marked users. 2. Construct a ρST-approximate Steiner tree T on F = Q ∪ {r}.
Connect each user j /
∈ Q to its closest facility in F .
In the following we outline how this algorithm can be turned into an approximate cross-monotonic cost sharing method.
Jain and Vazirani [4] gave a 2-approximate cross-monotonic cost sharing method, ξ ST , for the Steiner tree game, which we use in Step 2. We define a random cost share αj (Q) for each j ∈ Q as follows. Unfortunately, to compute the expected cost shares in polynomial time, one needs to derandomize the algorithm of Gupta et al. Besides some effort, we were not able to do so. However, we believe that the idea of sharing the expected cost will lead to attractive approximation ratios for cost sharing methods in the future. A similar approach has also been used in a recent independent work of Gupta, Srinivasan and Tardos [3] to obtain a polynomial time 4.5-approximate cross-monotonic cost sharing method for SSRB.
αj(Q)
:= M · ξ ST j (F ) if j ∈ F ,
CONNECTED FACILITY LOCATION
In a recent work Pál and Tardos [6] gave a 15-approximate cross-monotonic cost sharing method for SSRB. Their idea was to consider two processes: The cost shares are determined by a "ghost process", which is designed such that the cost shares are trivially cross-monotonic, and the actual solution is constructed by a "real process". We extend their result to CFL. Most of the details of the two processes are very similar to those given in [6] . For CFL, however, we additionally need to define a cost share that accounts for the opening costs of the facilities and decide which facilities are eventually opened.
Ghost Process. We make the simplifying assumption that the edges of G consist of a continuum of points, which we call locations. We associate a notion of time with this process. For each user j, we grow a ghost ball uniformly around j as time progresses. If M or more balls intersect a location p, we open p. At any time t, all open locations form a set C(t) of connected components. The evolution of C(t) mimics the standard primal-dual algorithm for Steiner trees, except that new components may appear over time. As in [6] , we use this process to define two cost shares: αj(Q), which accounts for j's contribution towards building the Steiner tree, and α j (Q), which accounts for j's connection cost. Additionally, we define a third cost share, α j , accounting for the opening costs. At time t, j contributes max(0, t − c(j, i)) to the opening cost of a facility i. If the total contribution towards i equals the opening cost fi, we open i. Let ti be the time when i is opened, and let Qi be the set of users that contribute to the opening of i at time ti. We define 
